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Abstract
The Nordic nations often rank among the most climate-prepared countries in the world,
especially in regards to their rapid switch to renewable energy. In contrast, climate change
legislation has faced an uphill battle in the United States, where environmentalists and activists
meet with climate change denialism and widespread reluctance to change energy consumption
habits. This thesis argues that the gap between American and Nordic adaptation arises in large
part from difference in social capital. In the United States, a recent decline in social trust and
increase in individualism endanger adaptation efforts, creating a culture of consumerism and
widespread reluctance to adapt. This decline in trust and collective action is encouraged by a
polarized media, which provides a foothold for climate change denialism. Meanwhile, in the
Nordic region, exceptional levels of social trust encourage collective action. Local populaces are
well-informed by their media outlets, which are relatively unpolarized and are held to high
standards by the citizenry and local governments. Wealth of social capital is the crucial
ingredient to climate change adaptation in developed societies; although both the USA and the
Nordic countries have the financial capacity and technological resources to go green, Nordic
social cohesion has provided the public support necessary to implement climate policy.
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Introduction
The phrase “Nordic exceptionalism” turns up nearly fifteen thousand results on Google.
Although we credit these miniscule northern nations for their minimalist furniture, fjords, and
cozy “hygge” culture, outsiders especially envy them for their strides in climate change
adaptation. When UK journalist Helen Russell started a new life in Denmark, she soon
discovered that “being eco-friendly... is seen as a basic duty and something you do to be a part of
Danish society.”1 Russell may have been unnerved when her new neighbors confronted her for
improperly sorting her trash,2 but the run-in was evidence that Nordic populations and
governments share a commitment to climate policy.
Citizens of other Nordic nations are just as likely to accept (and abide by) the government
climate change policies of their home countries. In the 2018 Climate Change Performance Index,
Sweden was the highest ranked country (although it took the “4th” spot—the top three positions
were left blank because no countries scored “very high.”)3 Finland and Norway followed close
behind, with Denmark scoring 17th.4 The four included Scandinavian nations scored
exceptionally high in renewable energy, trailing only Latvia and New Zealand.5 Where the
nations faltered, however, was in energy use: Denmark was the only Nordic nation to make the
top twenty, ranking thirteenth, while Finland weighed in at an abysmal forty-ninth place, with
“very low” performance.6

Helen Russell, The Year of Living Danishly: Uncovering the Secrets of the World’s Happiest Country ( London:
Icon Books LTD, 2015), chap. 1, Overdrive.
2
I bid.
3
“Climate Change Performance Index 2018,” Climate Change Performance Index, accessed January 27, 2019,
https://www.climate-change-performance-index.org/.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
1
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This pitfall is consistent with a less reported aspect of Scandinavian climate impact:
although Nordic nations are at the forefront of renewable energy adoption, they still burn a lot of
fuel. The World Bank found that Scandinavian CO2 emissions per capita are far lower than
American emissions, but still formidable: while the USA consumed a colossal 16.5 metric tons
per capita in 2014, Norwegian residents consumed a concerning 9.3 metric tons.7 Sweden, with a
much diminished 4.5 metric tons per capita,8 can credit a decreased carbon footprint to a
successful transition to renewable energy: as of 2015, fossil fuels only accounted for a quarter of
Swedish energy consumption.9 Of the OECD member states, Iceland consumed the highest
amount of energy per capita as of 2017.10 Most of this energy is channeled into Iceland’s
industries (81 percent of Icelandic electricity use is in metal production), and fossil fuels are
generally foregone in favor of renewable energy sources.11
It takes a lot to keep the Nordic nations running. Transportation is longer due to a
spread-out, sparse population distribution, while cold winters necessitate extra heating.12
Multiple trades much like Iceland’s metal industry require high energy consumption, and even
more energy is required to maintain the Nordic lifestyle— contrary to what Scandinavian
minimalism trends might lead you to believe, the region’s inhabitants are active consumers.13
Here’s where Nordic “exceptionalism” comes into play. Given the high energy use and
demands of Scandinavian nations, renewable energy must be continuously improved and

7

“CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita),” World Bank, accessed January 27, 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC.
8
Ibid.
9
“Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total),” World Bank, accessed January 27, 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS.
10
Timothy Bird, “Nordic Action on Climate Change,” Nordic Council of Ministers,
http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2017-766, 18.
11
Ibid.
12
Timothy Bird, “Nordic Action on Climate Change,” 7.
13
Ibid.
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incorporated into public and private life. The standards that Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland,
and Iceland set for their own energy use are steep, but they are remarkably adept at meeting
them. In 2016, for the same carbon dioxide emissions, Nordic nations were producing five times
as much electricity as the average nation.14 As of 2015, roughly 58 percent of Norwegian energy
consumption was renewable,15 and in 2017 over forty percent of Danish electricity was wind
powered.16 Finland hopes to produce 80 percent less greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, and by
the same year Iceland hopes to reduce emissions by at least 50 percent.17 Sweden leads the pack
with its climate goal: by 2045, the nation expects to completely eliminate greenhouse gas
emissions.18
Given that the Nordic nations additionally enjoy low poverty rates, suffer minimal
income inequality,19 and consistently dominate the World Happiness Report (Finland took the
top slot from Norway in 2018)20 it seems likely that successes in Nordic climate adaptation could
be linked to the overwhelming wealth of Nordic social capital. What do Nordic social
arrangements have to do with climate change adaptation, and what are Nordic populaces doing
differently from the United States? How individualist are the United States and the Nordic
nations, and how does that advantage or disadvantage our fight against the climate change
threat? Does the way we interact with our media and the extent of our social trust affect our
climate response?

14

Ibid.
“Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption),” World Bank, accessed January 27, 2019,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS.
16
Magnus Hornø Gottlieb and Grøn Milepæl, “Danmark sætter ny rekord i vind,” Dansk Energi, J anuary 3, 2018,
https://www.danskenergi.dk/nyheder/danmark-saetter-ny-rekord-vind.
17
Timothy Bird, “Nordic Action on Climate Change,” 7.
18
Ibid.
19
Income inequality (indicator), OECD, 2019, http://doi.org/10.1787/459aa7f1-en.
20
Patrick Collinson, “Finland is the Happiest Country in the World, Says UN Report,” Guardian, March 14, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/14/finland-happiest-country-world-un-report.
15
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Literature Review: Social Capital and Trust
The way members of a society relate to one another—including the populace’s
relationship with the media, degree of societal individualism, and social trust—is largely
determined by degree of social capital. Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama create their own
visions of this broad concept, the under examined advantage of well-connected societies that
could prove monumental in the fight against climate change. While Putnam warns against the
possible dangers of social capital, a double-edged sword that can be used to unite or damage a
society, Fukuyama sings its praises as an economic boon and considers human networking a
deciding factor in national wellbeing.

Robert Putnam
In Bowling Alone, R
 obert Putnam defines social capital as “connections among
individuals:” the networks built between members of a society that create cultural norms of trust
and reciprocity.21 Putnam’s social capital can be formed through family ties, membership in civic
organizations, workplace interactions, and even over the internet.22 Putnam’s definition places
the concept of social capital in conversation with that of civic virtue: social capital provides the
relations and networks that make members of a society conduct themselves morally.23 Overall,
Putnam’s social capital can be split into two categories: bridging social capital, which unites
members of diverse social groups and affiliations (exemplified by the Civil Rights Movement)

Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community ( New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000), 19.
22
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 21.
23
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 19.
21
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and bonding social capital, which builds solidarity by uniting member of homogenous groups
(exemplified by the ethnic fraternity).24
Among social capital’s many benefits is the creation of social trust. Complex networks of
human relationships allow individuals to build reputations, which Putnam considers the
“foundation of trust in a complex society.”25 In large part, reputations and trust rely on norms of
reciprocity. These norms, reinforced by the unspoken rules of social connection, can simply
involve exchanges between individuals, in which one party expects direct compensation for a
favor.26 However, more central to social trust are the norms of generalized r eciprocity generated
by social capital. These norms speed societal processes just as currency streamlines economic
activity: rather than exchanging favor for favor, expecting immediate compensation, we aid each
other knowing that the favor will someday be repaid by another individual.27 In Putnam’s vision,
humans are bonded by these unspoken rules of conduct, a complex web of mutual obligations
that binds society as a whole and facilitates trust.28
However, Putnam is quick to point out that social capital can be used for purposes
contrary to the public welfare. Urban gangs and societal elites can manipulate their social capital.
29

Ultimately, these groups repurpose their extensive networks to damage a community’s trust

and reciprocity, the very benefits with which we generally associate social capital.

Francis Fukuyama

Putnam, Bowling Alone, 22.
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 21.
26
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 20.
27
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 21.
28
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 20.
29
Putnam, Bowling Alone, 19.
24
25
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In Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, F
 rancis Fukuyama cites
James Coleman’s definition of social capital: “the ability of people to work together for common
purposes in groups and organizations.”30 To Fukuyama, social capital is more than a boon: it’s an
essential relief to human burden, soothing the “acute sense of unease” he believes humans feel
without social norms to connect them to their neighbors.31 Where Putnam warns that social
capital has its drawbacks, Fukuyama credits it in large part for the successes of prominent
nations. Rather, he criticizes organizations and societies that limit t he formation of social capital.
Fukuyama blames socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for wiping out civil society
and Confucianism in societies like Taiwan, Singapore, and China for an emphasis on family ties,
which he believes limit the formation of inter-citizen trust necessitated by economic transactions
and strong corporations.32
According to Fukuyama, the importance of social capital relates to the growing role of
human capital i n modern society. Physical capital—the possession of tools and resources—is
less and less valuable to modern economies and cultures; instead, true value lies in human
capability and knowledge.33 Social capital, our “ability to associate with each other,” is an often
underestimated strain of human capital.34
In particular, Fukuyama believes that social capital plays a central role in national wealth:
although we tend to view the economy as an isolated phenomenon, independent of cultural
influences and operating under its own set of rules, Fukuyama points out that each and every

Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity ( New York: Simon & Schuster,
1995), 10.
31
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 6 .
32
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 56.
33
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 10.
34
Ibid.
30
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economic activity requires the “social collaboration of human beings.”35 Thus, social capital and
trust make for economic efficiency and success: during economic exchanges, individuals
collaborate with each other only when they feel that they have established a trust-based
connection.36 Fukuyama makes a bold claim: degree of societal trust can make or break a nation.
37

To Fukuyama, all strong economies share one trait: a population pulled together by the ties of

social trust.38

Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 6 .
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 8 .
37
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 7 .
38
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 9 .
35
36
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Nordic Social Capital: Trust and Janteloven

Janteloven
Stay in Scandinavia for awhile, and you might pick up on a unique set of cultural norms, a group
of unwritten rules that supposedly structure Nordic societies. The Law of Jante centers around
the idea that distinguishing oneself or placing oneself on a pedestal is embarrassing and
undesirable.39 When Londoner journalist Helen Russell moved to Denmark with her husband,
who began to work with Lego, she was bemused to discover that the company mantra was “Lego
over ego.”40 In the office, no one was congratulated for putting in extra hours and labor to stand
out— to the contrary, they might be encouraged to improve their efficiency.41 Russell’s husband
was encountering the far-reaching Law of Jante, which reveals itself yet more notably in
Norwegian schools, which have been criticized for neglecting to give star pupils special
treatment.42 It’s worth noting that Janteloven is often disavowed by Scandinavians or declared a
relic of the past; half of the respondents to a 2008 newspaper survey in Denmark considered
Janteloven a term that unsuccessful people overused to cover for their own inadequacies.43
However, when asked if Janteloven was a modern feature of Danish life, about 75 percent of
those surveyed believed it was.44 When asked what brought out Janteloven disapproval,

Eric Gordy, "Conformity: The Lock-in Effect of Social Ties," in Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 1:
Towards Understanding of Social and Cultural Complexity (London: UCL Press, 2018), 255.
40
Russell, The Year of Living Danishly, chap. 2.
41
Ibid.
42
Gordy, "Conformity,” 257.
43
Ibid.
44
Gordy, “Conformity,” 258.
39
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respondents indicated that success and education weren’t societal triggers, but rather ostentatious
displays of wealth, such as plastic surgery and expensive vehicles.45

The Finnish Educational Exceptionalism: Janteloven at Work
If there’s one nation you can trust to provide a quality education, it’s Finland—an academic
dreamland where playtime is never undervalued, teachers are encouraged to experiment in the
classroom, and homework is approaching obsolete.46 Much like Janteloven, Finnish schools
operate under the assumption that no one individual should receive better treatment than another;
college education is free, and private schools don’t exist.47 Finnish teachers are well-educated,
but the secret to their success lies in a Janteloven-s tyle educational policy of cooperation over
competition.48 Critics may worry that encouraging schools and teachers to improve together
rather than to compete will remove opportunities for talented students to excel. The success of
the system, however, proves that egalitarian education doesn’t have to mean universal
mediocrity: Finland consistently tops world education rankings.49

Testing for Janteloven
In 2014, Bromgard et al. tested the presence of Janteloven among Norwegians by
showing participants photos of a person expressing pride and comparing their reactions to those

Gordy, “Conformity,” 258-9.
Chris Weller, “8 Reasons Finland's Education System Puts the US Model to Shame,” Business Insider, December
6, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/finland-education-beats-us-2017-5.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
45
46
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of American respondents.50 The respondents were asked to label the subject with various traits,
which were in turn grouped into positive and negative characteristics (including “annoying,”
“schadenfreude,” and “smug” for negative traits, and “friendliness,” “trust,” “loyal,” and
“honest” for positive ones).51 Norwegians ascribed negative traits more readily to the image than
did Americans, and were additionally less likely to ascribe positive traits.52

Social Trust
When Helen Russell took to the Danish streets, she was shocked like many visitors
before her to see prams left outside of cafes, babies and all.53 Nordic society enjoys a stunning
wealth of social trust, r evealed as much by unlocked bicycles in the streets of Copenhagen as by
its rankings in trust surveys.54 Copenhagen native Anette Sørensen in 1997 discovered the rarity
of this trust exceptionalism when she left her child in a stroller in front of a New York City
restaurant as she sat inside.55 Sørensen was outraged when her decision landed her in prison for
36 hours, later proclaiming that her parenting methods were a demonstration of Danish tillid, or
trust.56 About the response she received from the American police force, Sørensen complained
that Americans “live in fear.”57 But what makes Nordic society trusting enough to leave children
out on the streets, a practice that Americans consider child endangerment?

50

G. Bromgard, D. Trafimow, and C. Linn, “Janteloven and the Expression of Pride in Norway and the United
States,” The Journal of Social Psychology 154, no. 5 (September-October 2014): 4,
http://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2014.914884.
51
Bromgard, Trafimow, and Linn, “Janteloven and the Expression of Pride,” 4.
52
Bromgard, Trafimow, and Linn, “Janteloven and the Expression of Pride,” 4-5.
53
Russell, The Year of Living Danishly, chap. 8.
54
Russell, The Year of Living Danishly, prologue.
55
Raquel Laneri, “I Went to Jail for Leaving my Baby Outside a Restaurant,” New York Post, November 25, 2017,
https://nypost.com/2017/11/25/i-went-to-jail-for-leaving-my-baby-outside-a-restaurant/.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
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Nordic Trust Exceptionalism
To determine the level of social trust in a population, surveyors ask individuals if they consider
people to be generally trustworthy.58 The results tell us how a population sees itself—do
respondents consider their fellow man to be fundamentally immoral and untrustworthy, or
reliable and ethically motivated?59 In recent decades, social trust has exploded in the Nordic
nations. In 1979, less than half of Danes trusted their neighbors.60 As of the 90s, Scandinavia was
already the region with the highest social trust.61 In 2009, the number of Danes who agreed that
people were fundamentally trustworthy had rocketed to 79 percent.62 In 2014, the European
Social Survey ranked several European nations’ social trust, revealing a median score of about
five out of ten.63 Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden took the top spots— all four scored
between six and seven.64 These tremendous strides come at a time when many countries are
experiencing losses in social trust.65 Social trust has proven to be such a uniquely Nordic asset
that the Nordic Council of Ministers has dubbed it Nordic Gold.66

Nordic Trust: Seeking an Explanation

58

Kim Mannemar Sønderskov and Peter Thisted Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism: Explaining the Unique Increase
in Social Trust Over the Past 30 Years,” European Sociological Review 30, no. 6 (December 2014): 3,
https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcu073.
59
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold: Nordic Council of Ministers Analysis Report,” 21,
http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2017-737.
60
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 4.
61
Rafael La Porta et al., “Trust in Large Organizations,” National Bureau of Economic Research,
https://www.nber.org/papers/w5864.pdf.
62
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 4.
63
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 13.
64
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 14.
65
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 15.
66
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 10.
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The source of Nordic trust exceptionalism is heavily debated, but it seems likely that it lies in a
combination of factors. High levels of social trust are commonly credited to transparent
institutions, welfare states, homogenous populations, quality education, civilian associations, and
even certain religious profiles.67 Since social trust is so hard to source, researchers debate
whether Nordic trust is a new phenomenon or a long-held cultural characteristic.68 Theories that
attempt to explain the sources of social trust are divided in two camps: social e xplanations,
which credit civil society participation and networking, and institutional e xplanations, which
credit institutions for the socioeconomic conditions they create.69 Delving into Nordic history
and culture, it soon becomes apparent that numerous explanations can be found for trust
exceptionalism.

Trust: A Nordic History
Some believe that Nordic trust exceptionalism can be tracked back beyond living generations to
the age of the Vikings, pointing to the trade of the era as evidence of social capital.70 However,
studies show that trust has varied greatly between contemporary generations; as newer
generations age and take the older generations’ place in Danish society, they become
increasingly t rustful.71 This change, a shift that occurred after the war, is too recent to be credited
to the Vikings. Instead, some theorists point to Nordic populations’ membership in voluntary
associations.72 In the 19th century, Nordic popular movements emerged, creating voluntary

67

Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 14.
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 1.
69
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 14.
70
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 15.
71
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 2.
72
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 7.
68
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democratic associations that united populations through reciprocal bonds of trust.73 The Nordic
state worked in conjunction with associations; they are subsidized by tax dollars and supported
by their governments, regardless of whether or not the association itself supports the state.74 This
relationship simultaneously builds the state’s reputation for transparency and allows the
association to build social capital and trust.75 Additionally, the association works as a tool for the
state; through membership, a Nordic individual can shape politics in their own country.76 Civil
society participation remains strong; historically popular associations are being pushed out by the
popularity of new groups, including sports, culture, environment, and politics-focused groups.77

Education
A common explanation given for plentiful social trust is quality education. Among datasets of
Danish respondents who were asked to affirm or deny that “most people can be trusted,” a higher
education background made a respondent’s probability of answering affirmatively rise from 0.58
to 0.93.78 Scandinavian education has been much-lauded in recent years, drawing supporters
through unconventional methods ranging from limited homework79 to “forest schools,”
kindergartens held partially in the woods.80 In 2015, PISA results saw trust superstar Denmark
rank 12th, 18th, and 21st in math, reading, and science, respectively.81 Norway ranked 19th, 9th,

73

Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 9.
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 16.
78
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 15.
79
 Weller, “8 Reasons Finland's Education System Puts the US Model to Shame.”
80
Timothy D. Walker, “Kindergarten, Naturally,” Atlantic, S
 eptember 15, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/09/kindergarten-naturally/500138/.
81
Abby Jackson and Andy Kiersz, “The Latest Ranking of Top Countries in Math, Reading, and Science is Out —
and the US Didn't Crack the Top 10,” Business Insider, December 6, 2016,
https://www.businessinsider.com/pisa-worldwide-ranking-of-math-science-reading-skills-2016-12.
74
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and 24th in the same categories; Sweden pulled in at 24th, 17th, and 28th; and Finland excelled
at 12th, 4th, and 5th.82 Although positive, these results seem insufficient to fully explain trust
exceptionalism to the degree observed in the Nordic nations.

Quality Institutions and Protestantism
Another common theory used to explain the strength of Nordic social trust is the presence of
quality institutions and a lack of hierarchical religious practice. A 2015 Eurostat ranking of trust
in public institutions across thirty-three European countries placed Finland second, immediately
followed by Norway, and Sweden.83 Although Iceland lagged at 14th, trust was overall higher
than the average surveyed across OECD EU nations.84 These rankings are justified: of the Nordic
nations, four ranked among the top ten least corrupt globally in the Transparency International
index; Iceland lagged not far behind at 14th of 176.85 Trust in institutions should only increase as
these public institutions become increasingly effective in servicing the population as part of the
welfare state; theoretically, in a society serviced by institutions that are strong, incorrupt, and
effective, a populace will feel better supported by its government and societal trust will increase.
86

The strong institutions present in Nordic nations to service the welfare state combine with a

history of Protestantism to raise societal trust. Authors like Putnam suspect that hierarchical
religions like Catholicism discourage s ocial trust by tamping down on network-based social
capital.87 Due to the hierarchies created by these religions, “vertical bonds of authority” take

82

Jackson and Kiersz, “The Latest Ranking of Top Countries.”
Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Max Roser, “Trust,” accessed January 27, 2019, https://ourworldindata.org/trust.
84
Ibid.
85
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 17.
86
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 7.
87
La Porta et al., “Trust in Large Organizations.”
83
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precedence over (and prevent the creation of) “horizontal bonds of fellowship” that link
populations and establish social trust.88 The very public institutions o f a nation are warped by the
presence of a hierarchical religion in a society; better judiciaries, bureaucracies, civic society,
and infrastructure are all associated with a lack of prominent hierarchical religions.89 In contrast,
the five Nordic nations are all historically Protestant.90 This non-hierarchical religion can be
partially credited for the quality and transparency of Nordic social institutions, as well as
subsequent social capital and social trust.

Homogeneity
An additional theory for the success of Nordic social capital and trust is the degree of
homogeneity in the population. The Nordic nations have ethnically homogenous populations with
relative income equality and linguistic homogeneity.91 With these traits come an increased
wealth of social capital. An equal economic playing field decreases motivation to be dishonest or
untrustworthy92 and prevents class resentment,93 while ethnic homogeneity prevents ethnic
conflict.94 However, the Nordic region is changing; globalization has brought immigration,
economic inequality, and political division northward.95 These shifts make for an increasingly

88

La Porta et al., “Trust in Large Organizations.”
Ibid.
90
Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic
Exceptionalism?" European Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (2005): 320,
http://www.jstor.org.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/stable/4621213.
91
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 17.
92
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 7.
93
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 21.
94
Sønderskov and Dinesen, “Danish Exceptionalism,” 7.
95
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 18.
89
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heterogeneous population that may find social cohesion and trust more difficult to maintain than
ever before.96

The Nordic Populace and the Media

A Regional Media Culture
Although the Nordic nations have differing media structures and cultures, they tend to operate
under certain common principles.97 Because of these commonalities, Trine Syvertsen et al. dub
the Nordic media model the Media Welfare State.98 This model features prominent public service
institutions with a strong following, exceptionally high readership,99 and an audience that still
tends to access its news directly, rather than through social media, search engines, or
aggregators.100 One of the reasons the Nordic media model works so well is because of a
conscious, involved government with a deeply embedded respect for freedom of speech.101 This
government input has allowed for the success of public broadcasters like YLE in Finland102 and
DR and TV2 in Denmark.103 When asked which news sources they’d used in the last week, 72

Ibid.
Trine Syvertsen et al., The Media Welfare State: Nordic Media in the Digital Era ( Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/nmw.12367206.0001.001.
96
97

Ibid.
Lauren Kirchner, “Seven Lessons Scandinavian Media Can Teach Us,” Columbia Journalism Review, July 2,
2012, https://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/seven_lessons_scandinavian_med.php.
100
Nic Newman, “Overview and Key Findings of the 2018 Report,” Digital News Report,
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/overview-key-findings-2018/.
101
Trine Syvertsen et al., The Media Welfare State.
102
Esa Reunanen, “Finland,” Digital News Report, http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/finland-2018/.
103
Kim Christian Schrøder and Mark Ørsten, “Denmark,” Digital News Report,
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/denmark-2018/.
98
99
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percent of Finnish respondents had used YLE in some capacity.104 In Denmark, 62 percent of
respondents had used DR, while 61 percent had used TV2.105

Despite the monopolies public service institutions maintain over media production, much of
Scandinavian media culture relies on outside influence, particularly from the United States and
the rest of Europe.106 Anglo-American influences, including film, music, and TV, form the
gateway to the outer world;107 in Norway, between 50 and 80 percent of the material that
audiences watch is American.108 Although the Nordic nations move rapidly towards a more
globalized media, local news and influences remain prominent influences. Despite competition,
state-funded media organizations maintain impressive readership and have become a central
feature of local culture.109

Trust and the media
One of the easiest ways to gauge the Nordic populations’ relationship to their media is in
their trust. Nordic media outlets are facing a crowd that’s difficult to please. Although Sweden,
Finland, Norway, and Denmark are time and time again listed among the top countries in the
world for freedom of the press,110 Nordic audiences’ high media consumption makes them
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critical of their news sources.111 When an audience expects quality, a provider has to deliver. The
pressures of audience accountability have helped to transform the Nordic media landscape into
one of careful self-regulation. 112 State-led efforts to hold journalism accountable to the people
have paid off: the Nordic public tends to trust public broadcasters more than other news sources
and institutions, and pays more for online news than populations of other regions do.113
In Finland, where politics and media are relatively unpolarized, trust in media is highest.
Finland came in first of 37 countries ranked by the 2018 Digital News Report, with 62% of
Finnish respondents confirming that they trusted news overall.114 In contrast, Sweden ranked
quite low, at 23rd out of the 37 countries; only 41 percent of respondents trusted the news,
despite an impressive rate of 26 percent of the population paying for online news.115 In Denmark,
56 percent of respondents trusted the news in general, with little variation between public and
private media providers.116 In Norway, that figure sank to 47 percent—the most distrustful
respondents tended to belong to the political far-right.117 Before the 2017 elections, concerns
arose in Norway as to the possible interference of fake news, causing the birth of the
fact-checking site Faktisk.no.118
Nordic media groups have confronted this skepticism head on with extensive
self-regulation, intended to hold them accountable to their audience and prove them bias-free.119
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These institutions range from press councils that review reader criticism to frequent surveys and
analyses that measure party bias and reception.120 The Nordic nations emphasize government
transparency, meaning that whistleblowers and journalists are well protected by shield laws.121
In Sweden, the Principle of Public Access requires complete transparency of government
communications, court records, and other documents.122 Protections of journalists, combined
with an extensive institutional network holding them accountable to the people, allow the Nordic
media to maintain its extensive readership despite high audience standards.

Changing Tides
Despite the success of public broadcasters and the high standards Nordic media outlets are held
to, recent years have seen media consumption become more and more politically polarized.
Audiences now tend to draw from commercial media outlets as well as public ones.123 In 2018,
European public service broadcasters were frequently accused of partisanship, and in March the
right-wing Danish government made a five-year plan to cut public broadcaster DR’s funding by
a fifth.124 In Sweden, a polarized media is likewise emerging. Stunting funding for reliable public
service outlets may seem counterproductive given fears about fake news, but about 10% of
internet-using Swedes read each of four of the most prominent partisan news sites every week,
most of which are right wing.125 Similarly, in Finland, about one in 20 respondents had accessed
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MV-Lehti in the last week, a partisan site that opposes immigration and criticizes traditional
news sources.126

The Myth of American Individualism

Are Americans Individualists?
One of the American media’s most powerful impacts on US social arrangements is the fostering
of individualism. The 2000 World Values Survey asked respondents to rank the extent to which
they could determine their futures through personal “freedom of choice and control.”127 A sizable
44 percent of the American population answered a 9 or 10.128 American society values personal
autonomy and personality, holds individuals accountable for their actions, and resents state
control.129 Americans consider nepotism distasteful130 and consider themselves in possession of a
‘real self’ separate from and superior to the face they bring to social interactions.131 When we
split the world into ‘collectivists’ and ‘individualists,’ we tend to regard Japan and the United
States as the pinnacles of collectivism and individualism, respectively.132

Individualistic Collectivism
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However, this individualist identity may be skin deep; authors like Francis Fukuyama
believe that Americans have strong group associations, collectivist tendencies that distance them
from being a truly individualistic society.133 Fukuyama seeks to redefine the stereotypical
“American individualist,” noting that Americans share communitarian social values that reveal
more powerful collectivist ties than we tend to expect of them. Rather than compare the US with
Japan, the poster child of collectivism, Fukuyama points out the commonalities between the two,
including an affinity for membership in and creation of voluntary associations.134 Americans are
staunch defenders of loyalty in relationships, often rely on churches and religions to determine
their ethical stances, and are generally patriotic.135 When compared to populations of other
sizable Western countries, Americans are more inclined to respect the decisions of their
employers and to advocate for obedience to the law over personal morality.136 In fact, the degree
to which Americans espouse collectivist social values makes Williams label them conformists.137
Claude S. Fischer believes that the conventional conception of American individualism
is “egoistic and asocial,” and suggests that instead American values center around “covenantal,
social voluntarism.”138 Williams chalks American ‘individualism’ down to a strong individual
personality, an aversion to state meddling and a desire for economic freedom—Americans don’t
operate according to the “every man for himself” mentality we expect from them.139 Rather, they
reveal underlying collectivist values in their voluntarism and group loyalty.140 Americans tend to
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show more investment in friendships than their European counterparts do, and they join more
organizations.141 When French diplomat Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the
19th century, he was impressed to find a wealth of associations, noting that “Americans of all
ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations…. Nothing,
in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America.”142
The US has continued this long history of extensive civil society and voluntary organization
membership into modern times; Americans have always been deeply involved in their churches,
schools, and charities.143

The Individualist Nature of American Group Association
American “group” culture is one of paradox. Collectivism and individualism coexist in
civil society: the individual is valued as an autonomous entity, but is expected to freely make and
honor group associations.144 Leaving is always acceptable;145 when the group fails to provide
personal fulfillment to the individual, they will choose another. This ease of group transference is
best demonstrated by the frequency of religious conversion.146 Americans feel free to change
these commitments and to use them to further personal needs; however, they also tend to view
group loyalties as contractual.147 Since a member can choose to leave a group as they wish, if
they choose to stay they are expected to respect the rules and expectations of group membership.
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148

This combination of personal autonomy and group cohesion is especially evident in American

views towards marriage; divorce is permissible and reasonable, but before a marriage ends both
spouses are expected to remain faithful.149 Once an American chooses to join a church or a club,
to start a family, or to marry, they are held to their decision and expected to honor the
commitment made to the collective.150

The Dying Art of Association
The unique American brand of individualistic collectivism is dissolving—social capital is
endangered by speedily declining rates of association.151 As the baby boomers age and younger
generations mature, a generation gap in community involvement becomes increasingly
pronounced.152 Younger Americans are less likely to work for political parties, sign petitions,153
or even to take an active interest in public affairs than their predecessors.154 Involvement in
non-political avenues of community life decreased at a comparable rate.155 Americans may not
have been staunch individualists before, but they’re certainly on track to fulfilling their lone wolf
image;156 membership in top associations increased throughout the early 20th century, reached its
peak in the early 60s, and began a steady decline after 1969.157 Putnam warns that we are losing
our advantage in social capital, relying on cold, hard economic wealth to carry us forward.158
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Fukuyama suggests that Americans reevaluate their stance on collectivism: at the roots of the
problem lie a refusal to recognize American association for the asset that it is.159

Social Trust
Perhaps the most concerning effect of declining association in America is the subsequent
decline in social trust. Social trust is cyclically related to civil society: just as trusting your
neighbor will encourage you to join him at the local bowling league, joining the league will help
you to trust other strangers in the future. These kinds of connections between strangers are the
valuable results of wealth in networking social capital.
Networking social capital is made up of a series of norms of trust and reciprocity in a
populace;160 in the United States, these norms allow the individual to exchange religions and
group identities with ease. Fukuyama believes that social trust is endangered by America’s recent
shift towards individualism. Surveys of American trust affirm his fears: the General Social
Survey, which measured trust in the American population from 1972 to 2014, saw the number of
respondents who believed that “most people can be trusted” decrease from 46 to 31 percent in
forty years.161 Yet more worrying is a subsequent increase in antistatist sentiment: the OECD
finds a strong link between social trust and trust in institutions.162 In 2018, studies show
Americans trusted their government less than ever before,163 expanding on what Fukuyama
considers a “strong antistatist tradition.”164
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America has always profited from its social capital, able to form social cohesions and
civic organizations between strangers.165 Because of this capability, Fukuyama characterizes the
United States as a traditionally “high trust, group-oriented society.”166 However, as community
involvement breaks down, churches lose members, and divorce rates increase,167 societal trust
dissolves. Fukuyama worries that American democracy itself is in danger along with its social
capital: as societal distrust becomes increasingly prevalent, litigation and mass imprisonment
become more frequent.168 Americans are paying the price of attaining the individualism they so
identify with.

Pitfalls of Individualistic Collectivism

The individualism-collectivism d ichotomy present in American society has its downsides. Since
Americans believe strongly in the freedom of choice behind group association, twice as many
Americans as Europeans hold the poor accountable for their situation and attribute poverty to
laziness.169 Additionally, since Americans see the groups they belong to as avenues through
which to advance personal goals,170 they are prone to social loafing, or skirting their duties when
they can get away with the negligence. In 1989, a study compared rates of social loafing among
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American and Chinese managers.171 Americans were more effective when held accountable for
their work, whereas their Chinese counterparts performed well even without accountability.172

Segregation and Group Tensions
One glaring exception to the nature of American group association is the social
construction of racial identity: although Americans choose their partners, clubs, political parties,
and religious associations, they are placed at birth into racial groups. Centuries of systematic
oppression of peoples of color, particularly Black Americans, have created a segregated society
in which White Americans are generally surrounded by White communities and interact
minimally with Black Americans.173 Political sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva describes the
new face of American racism: White Americans claim “colorblindness” in order to mask the pain
of the Black American experience and to hold on to the benefits of White privilege.174 Racism
has become less detectable and more palatable in the USA, but continues to contributes heavily
to segregation through racial group association.
Segregation and discrimination in American society additionally damages the social trust
of targeted groups. Orlando Patterson’s 1999 study of American trust revealed that the least
privileged of Americans were also the least trusting. In the American trust divide, African
Americans were less trusting than any other ethnic group and poor Americans were less trusting
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than rich ones.175 The results suggested to Patterson that social distrust is primarily propagated by
“anxiety and insecurity.”176 His theory was further supported by the gender gap in American trust
rates—American women are often less trusting than their male counterparts, a discrepancy that is
far less common elsewhere in the western world.177 If insecurity fuels distrust, it’s little wonder
that groups that have faced centuries of oppression should experience more of it than those that
have received race-based privileges.

Consumerism and the American Media
As Americans lose their social capital, their relationship to the media exacerbates the
problem, contributing to a culture of consumerism. Americans like to keep their cell phones up
to date and take out credit card debt on trendy cars that bear little resemblance to the puny energy
savers Norwegians favor. If there’s one thing Americans like more than fast food and summer
camp, it’s the accumulation of stuff. M
 arie Kondo’s b ook The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying
Up s old over 1.5 million copies in the USA.178 Negative reviews complained that they didn’t
need a guru to teach them how to spring clean, but most disagreed; one eager Amazon reviewer
confesses to a “tortured relationship with stuff” and claims Kondo’s minimalist method can
“finally kick the clutter habit.” Every year, foreign onlookers are stunned by footage of Black
Friday, as hordes of frenzied shoppers trample each other in pursuit of discounted gadgets and
gizmos. But what drove the US to accumulate a consumerist mentality in the first place?
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To understand this culture of instant gratification, look no further than the development
of American advertising, the creation of what author Tim Wu terms “the attention merchants.”179
These media developers seek to harness the commercial profits of human attention.180 American
news and entertainment media have long been intimately connected to this play, providing the
perfect combination of sustained interest and source credibility to advertise.
The US media is intimately connected to advertising and commercial motives: American
advertising and news developed alongside each other. In 1833, American opportunist Benjamin
Day created the world’s most popular newspaper, The New York Sun.181 Day’s product was the
first “penny paper;” he used advertising to slash newspaper prices.182 Production costs were met
not by the readership’s penny but by the advertiser’s dime, allowing Day to amass nearly 20,000
readers in two years.183 American interests could now be monetized, intimately intertwining
media sources with commercial backers.
The media-advertising machine exploded in Britain with the outbreak of World War I,
which necessitated impassioned masses of supporters.184 In the USA, propaganda became a way
of life, as Uncle Sam was co-opted for recruitment posters and cinema-goers participated in the
Four Minute Man program, delivering short speeches in support of American war involvement.
185

Mobilization messages spread through posters, print, the motion picture, telegraph, cable, and

wireless.186 Soon, corporations found that they could co-opt the propaganda campaign, using
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advertising to build customer loyalty and showcase their products.187 The results were striking.
Between 1923 and 1929, American consumption spending increased by 25 percent.188 As brands
exploded, shaping American tastes and establishing customer loyalties, new medias formed and
were adapted to the growing advertisement industry.

The Cult of the Individual
American advertising can additionally be blamed for the American “individualism” myth.
Because of carefully targeted ad campaigns, the US began to view itself in the 60s as a culture of
personalities,189 rather than one of collectivism and social capital. When a wave of
countercultural movements presented a threat to American consumerism, waging an ideological
war against the capitalist system, advertising adapted to the times by bringing countercultural
crowds into the consumerist machine.190 TV shows and ad campaigns targeted marginalized
groups and individualized their content to suit specific audiences.191 In the 60s, Pepsi ran ads that
targeted young ‘rebels,’ encouraging them to “think different” and consider themselves the
“Pepsi generation.”192 Tim Wu credits this shift for making individualism “the dominant
American ethos, even of capitalism itself.”193 The later advent of social media would only aid the
rise of targeted content. Advertisers are increasingly able to use the data from Google and
Facebook to sell products to individuals,194 rather than to the generic “Average American” they

Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants, chap. 4, Overdrive.
Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants, chap. 4, Overdrive.
189
Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants, chap. 12, Overdrive.
190
Ibid.
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid.
193
Ibid.
194
Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants, chap. 16, Overdrive.
187
188

33

used to target. The American social identity of staunch individualism was purposefully
manufactured by the media and its close relationship with advertising dollars. American
consumption habits reflect on the individualistic hope to stand out from the crowd—a desire that
has been deliberately honed by advertising.

The Chickens and Eggs of Media Polarization
Just as the American media’s close knit relationship with advertising drove Americans to
lust for the latest shoes, cars, and gadgets, this same relationship drove the media to levels of
polarization unheard of in the Western world. Breitbart, a far-right website watched by 19
percent of American conservatives in 2017,195 runs headlines like “Hillary Clinton’s Muslim
Brotherhood Problem” and “Birth Control makes Women Unattractive and Crazy.” Meanwhile,
liberal website Buzzfeed196 has made a “definitive ranking” of Clinton’s pantsuits and a gif-laden
article entitled “13 Signs You And Your Birth Control Are Meant To Be.” Media in the USA is a
battlefield, and consumers are expected to choose sides.
Philip Bump of the Washington Post questions the source of American media
polarization, labeling the phenomenon a “chicken-egg” issue.197 What came first: the divide
between parties, or the divide between media outlets? If attention merchants are to blame, the
same money-hungry forces that dragged our attention to the latest refrigerators, shiniest toy
bikes, and sleekest cars likewise drew our attention to the most polarizing of news sources.
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Drama sells; even the far-right darling Fox News was beat at its own game in 2016.198 Former
head Roger Ailes explained the 2011 departure of incendiary commentator Glenn Beck by
labeling Beck’s attacks on Obama and liberals a “branding issue:” when the ‘drama’ became too
much for the public’s tastes, Fox eased leftwards.199 The choice would cost them, however;
during the 2015 to 2016 election season, Breitbart took first place in the media popularity contest
in Facebook and Twitter presence, and was linked to more than any other media source.200 In the
American media game, being moderate is being irrelevant.

Consequences of Media Polarization: Climate Change Denial
Despite a near universal scientific consensus as to climate change’s human origins, a
2018 Yale survey found that just 49 percent of respondents considered themselves “‘extremely’
or ‘very’ sure that global warming is happening.”201 One in five respondents discredited the
phenomenon entirely.202 This process of denial-based polarization has been made possible
through the workings of a conglomeration of organizations and individuals who profit from
American ignorance of the effects of climate change. Aaron M. McCright and Riley E. Dunlap
dub this grouping the “denial machine,” an American phenomenon that has begun to spread
internationally.203 The denial machine is primarily pushed forward in the American media by two
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forces: conservative think tanks, or CTTs, and their “contrarian scientist” supporters. CTTs
receive their funding from affluent conservative philanthropists and fossil fuel corporations,204
and use media platforms to spread their ‘alternative’ creed.205 They are often more trusted than
the corporations they represent,206 perhaps owing to their contrarian scientists, who receive the
benefits of media attention and CTT sponsorship in exchange for their public denunciation of
climate change science.207 The “balancing norm” of US news media puts an emphasis on
spotlighting both sides of an issue, even one with a scientific consensus like the existence of
climate change.208 Despite representing a discredited minority in the scientific community, CTTs
receive enough airtime to sway vast segments of the American public and to create a national
epidemic of climate change denial. The results of these efforts— a combination of CTT
intervention and media manipulation— is an American view of climate change that is
increasingly polarized.209
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Analysis
In Garrett Hardin’s paper Science, he confronts one of the biggest challenges of life in a
collective: the tragedy of the commons.210 When a Swede chooses to drive to work, a Californian
buys a SUV over a Prius, and a shopper in Copenhagen chooses fast fashion over the thrift store,
their seemingly benign choices build up to form a global threat that could mean the demise of
modern society: climate change. Because climate change affects us all, some believe we need
nothing short of a global social contract.211 However, in countries like the USA and the Nordic
nations, individual freedoms and rights are protected by law and cultural norms; instead of
imposing climate-friendly habits through legal control, public opinion must be shifted through
awareness and grassroots activism.212 But what makes a society want to adapt in the first
place—and why has American society failed to adequately address the shared climate threat?
Regions with high social resilience are adept adaptors,213 riding out changes like
environmental threats with ease. These resilient societies share traits like wealth of capital,
extensive resources, technology, well-educated populaces, and developed infrastructure.214 In
theory, both the USA and the Nordic nations should be resilient societies and excellent climate
change adaptors. However, climate change is a long-term problem that requires extensive
foresight and scientific input to evaluate risks and implement adaptation responses.215 Since
we’re traveling in uncharted territory, the climate threat appears unclear and adaptation is
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complicated.216 When societies assess risks, we weigh each threat’s probability a nd severity,217
along with our individual adaptation capability and likelihood of making a tangible difference.218
To respond, we need to believe that we are facing a serious and probable threat to our
well-being. However, our threat evaluation is flawed; we underestimate major threats and filter
our risk assessment through the availability heuristic, m
 easuring the risk based on tangible
memories of past crises.219 Even when a New Yorker decides that biking to work and going
vegan are possible a nd effective adaptive measures, he will most likely decide to forego the
efforts. A threat that he has never consciously faced himself will not seem dire enough to warrant
a change to his status quo, even when the hassle of TSA precautions seem perfectly reasonable
post 9/11.
In 1999, Risbey et al. identified four stages in public response to risk: signal detection,
when issues are judged worthy of adaptation or set aside; evaluation, w
 hen the consequences of
the threat are weighed; decision and response, w
 hen the society adapts to the threat, and
feedback, w
 hen the adaptation is monitored for effectiveness.220 At each of Risbey’s stages of
risk appraisal, the differences in United States and Nordic social capital and arrangements come
into play, shaping adaptation. These resilient societies may be more capable o f adapting to
climate change than most, but social capital determines whether they will take action or turn a
blind eye to the threat.
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The Media and Climate Change Adaptation
In the signal detection phase of risk assessment, a population undertakes the first step in
adaptation: determining which risks necessitate adaptation and which will be swept under the
rug.221 The media is considered one of the main institutions responsible for shaping risk
evaluation;222 the opinions espoused by talk show hosts and the articles that make it to the front
page make up a population’s first encounter with the climate risk. However, media outlets in
both the US and Nordic region have had their work cut out in them: historically, climate change
has been considered a relatively inconsequential threat in both regions. A 2002 poll found that
the percent of respondents “very worried” about climate change was lower t han the EU average
in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.223 In the USA, a 1992 Gallup Health of the Planet Survey
found that less than half of respondents considered climate change a serious threat.224
Unfortunately, the media has not equipped populaces to comprehend the climate change threat.
Surveys show that most Americans and Europeans cannot answer elementary science questions;
225

similarly, in 1999, surveys found that just 11 percent of US respondents and 17 percent of

Finnish ones could identify fossil fuels as the largest contributor to global warming.226
Unfortunately, climate change illiteracy is driven by media polarization; there are as many hot
takes on climate change as there are political parties.
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The American Denial Machine
The American media is characterized by a commitment to ad revenue and a shocking
degree of polarization; the Reuters Institute 2017 Digital News Report found that the media in
the United States is more polarized than in any other Western nation.227 As the news becomes
more and more politically polarized, so too does the climate change debate. In most nations, the
existence of man-made climate change is no more up for debate than the existence of forest fires.
After all, at least 97 percent of working climate scientists believe that it is “extremely likely” that
humans are causing global warming.228 However, denial is widespread in the United States.
Between 2001 and 2010, about 69 percent of liberals and 65 percent of Democrats believed that
global warming had already begun to take effect.229 In contrast, just 43 percent of conservatives
and 42 percent of Republicans said the same.230 Conservative white males contribute
disproportionately to the divide: 65 percent of this group believed that “seriousness of global
warming is generally exaggerated in the media,” while just 30 percent of all other adult
Americans believed the same.231
It’s no coincidence that the race, gender, and political preference of climate change
deniers overwhelmingly match that of the representatives of CTTs, corporations, and the media.
These voices use their media platforms to speak to the hearts of their fellows in the general
public. Newly indoctrinated individuals then spread their denialist views through their personal
connections and even through their own personal forms of media intervention, voicing denialism
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on social media and through the influential conservative blogosphere.232 In 2017, just one in five
American conservatives trusted the news; the same could be said of half of American liberals.233
In this environment of media distrust and media polarization, Americans are able to cherry pick
the sources that affirm their own attitudes towards climate change.234 Conservatives flock to Fox
News in droves— by 2017, two in three conservative Americans were viewers.235 This audience
becomes a front-seat spectator to Fox’s array of denialist-friendly content, with sets frequently
featuring contrarian scientists and CTT spokespersons. The introduction of Donald Trump, a
climate change denialist, to the political scene increased denialism even more. 2018 CBS News
poll found that 91 percent of Trump’s most stalwart supporters “trust him to provide accurate
information,” while 89 percent distrusted the news media.236

The Nordic Media Welfare State: No Space for Denialism?
The Nordic media lacks many of the traits that drive American news outlets to climate denialism.
A high degree of public broadcasting, as enabled by the Media Welfare State, makes for a less
polarized media scene. Nordic audiences are critical and distrustful of their news outlets.
However, where American media outlets have sought to profit off of distrust, driving forward
“alternative” news sources like Fox that preach climate change denialism, the Nordic news has
chosen self-regulation over sensationalism. P
 ress councils and surveys limit party bias in news
coverage, resulting in an audience that finds public broadcasters more trustworthy than

232

Dunlap and McCright, “Organized Climate Change Denial,” 153.
Edkins, “Report: U.S. Media Among Most Polarized In The World.”
234
McCright and Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change,” 157.
235
Edkins, “Report: U.S. Media Among Most Polarized In The World.”
236
Jim Rutenberg, “Trump’s Attacks on the News Media Are Working,” New York Times, October 28, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/business/media/trumps-attacks-news-media.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=c
ur&fbclid=IwAR3O1GEJ8Ho4xigwSd7Pz9HY4tIJd18oNdGiWXbJnHQopIyfPEmIo1D03Ic.
233

41

commercial ones. However, the Nordic media scene could be moving towards a denialist future;
recently, increasing polarization of media consumption has allowed right wing news sources to
gain a foothold with local audiences. If denialism becomes widespread, public opinion on
climate change policies will shift and the Nordic nations may become less adept adaptors.

Individualism and Adaptation
In the second stage of public adaptation, societies evaluate t he risk at hand, weighing its
consequences.237 However, individuals often underestimate the ways they can adapt, particularly
when it comes to environmental threats.238 Since the individual deems climate change an issue
that they cannot personally address, the role they believe they play in their own society is crucial
to their adaptive response. To adapt to a risk like climate change, a society must act collectively;
239

social capital is crucial to risk response, as it mobilizes collective action and provides

networks that spread awareness and aid in decision making.240 When asking ourselves why a
society adapts or ignores climate change, we should look to the individual: does John Doe
consider himself a cog in the system, or an autonomous actor who goes his own way?

Janteloven and Adaptation
The norm of Janteloven at work in Nordic societies should help mobilize public support for
climate adaptation policies. Under the Law of Jante, distinguishing oneself as superior is
undesirable. Climate change is difficult to address because individuals are nearly incapable of

237

Grothmann and Patt, “Adaptive Capacity and Human Cognition,” 201.
Grothmann and Patt, “Adaptive Capacity and Human Cognition,” 203.
239
Adger, “Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change,” 387.
240
Adger, “Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change,” 389.
238

42

tangibly impacting it; instead, populations push the issue aside, reassured that they won’t number
among those affected.241 When evaluating the risks of environmental destruction, societal
consequences appear far greater than individual ones.242 The privilege of owning a Hummer may
seem worth the carbon emissions to the driver, but the risks to society o f a gas-guzzling populace
are dire. For this reason, Janteloven is a useful tool to mobilize group action: it discourages
personal pride and encourages Nordic populations to view themselves as pieces of a collective.

American “Collectivism?”
In contrast, the nature of American individualism makes mobilizing collective action on climate
change nearly impossible. Americans are social animals, joining associations at stunning rates
(although this networking has declined in recent decades). However, they behave
individualistically w
 ithin their groups, viewing memberships as tools for personal fulfillment.243
This individualistic collectivism stands in the way of collective action; Americans are prone to
social loafing, neglecting their duties when they can’t be held accountable.244
Within an American group, rules and tradition are paramount, but the underlying motives
that cause an individual to join the group in the first place are self-interested. Because of this
contrast, Americans may be ill-equipped to use their collectivist traits in the fight against climate
change. Cutting consumption, switching to renewable energy, and changing energy habits
requires individual sacrifice for the common good. Additionally, although Americans are
traditionalists and social conformists,245 they resent “state meddling” and are highly wary of
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government intervention.246 Adger considers the bonds between state and society crucial to
climate change adaptation; this relationship allows the state to push forward sustainable
development measures and properly budget resources.247 However, as long as Americans remain
averse to government control, state efforts to impose green habits on the population will meet
with opposition. A combination of social loafing and government distrust proves lethal to
adaptation: without strong government policies to hold them accountable, Americans will shirk
their personal duties towards the climate and will continue to consume unsustainably.

Benefits of Social Trust to Adaptation
Hobbes believed that people were untrustworthy and self-interested, necessitating the
heavy-handed justice of a Leviathan to maintain order. The environmental “tragedy of the
commons,” some believe, requires a Hobbesian control mechanism248—after all, how can our
neighbors and countrymen be trusted to prioritize the environment over fast fashion and
automobiles? However, some sociologists believe that social trust itself is valuable to adaptation;
a society of distrusting Hobbeses will fail to adapt to the climate change threat, whereas a society
of trusting Danes will mobilize in collective action. The influence of social trust on adaptation
comes into play in the third stage of public adaptation, decision and response. W
 hen a society
begins to adapt to the climate change threat, individuals must decide whether giving up their
thirty minute showers and joy rides will by worth their while. If a society has a wealth of social
trust and capital (like the Nordic regions today, and the United States of yesteryear) individuals
will see the benefits of adaptation since they will trust their neighbors to do their part.
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The American Social Trust Decline: A Blow to Adaptive Capacity
Just as social trust encourages individual adaptation, a loss o f social capital makes
populations more vulnerable to environmental threats249 and endangers collective action.
Americans are transforming from a high trust society250 to one of individualism and
fragmentation. This loss in social trust is devastating: the degree to which people trust the
strangers around them reflects their expectations of their neighbors’ morality251 and their
willingness to cooperate with them through collective action.252 If the trends continue, Americans
will increasingly view their neighbors as “free riders” rather than as allies in the fight against
climate change, and will find personal contributions to the cause pointless.253 When social trust
decreases in a population, individuals are disinclined to pay their taxes, sort their trash, and even
to follow the law.254 What busy American is willing to sacrifice personal comforts for the good
of the environment if they can’t trust their neighbors to follow suit?

The Nordic Social Trust Boom
The acclaimed Nordic welfare state is made possible by an abundance of social capital; in
particular, trust in authorities and in fellow citizens allows for a successful system of taxation.255
This valuable resource is increasing i n Nordic populations; although individuals born before

249

Grothmann and Patt, “Adaptive Capacity and Human Cognition,” 200.
Francis Fukuyama, Trust, 1 0.
251
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 11.
252
La Porta et al., “Trust in Large Organizations.”
253
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 18.
254
Ibid.
255
Ulf Andreasson, “Trust—the Nordic Gold,” 21.
250

45

1945 in Denmark and the United States were roughly equal in social trust,256 a recent trust boom
in the Nordic region and trust crisis in the US created a rift between the two. Social trust has
become the “Nordic gold.”257
In addition to the benefits social trust poses for collective action, strong correlations have
been found between social trust and trust in institutions. Sønderskov finds that quality
institutions most likely contribute to increased social trust,258 although Fukuyama theorizes that
the relationship runs the other way around.259 Regardless of which came first, trust in institutions
and social trust are both high in Nordic populations; among thirty-three European nations,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden took three of the top four spots in trust in public institutions.260
Although this relationship should aid in climate change policy implementation, researchers warn
that government trust may be contributing to climate change complacency in Europe, owing to
widespread assurance that the government can handle whatever risks the climate threat brings its
way.261
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Conclusion
As temperatures rise, weather becomes more extreme, and flooding becomes the new
normal, global populations face a choice: to act, or to deny. When we face risks that seem too
daunting, we turn to maladaptation:262 rather than work to develop sustainably and invest in
renewable energy, we hide our heads in the sand and hope our descendents enjoy heatstroke.
Although denying the climate change threat allow us our gas-guzzling vehicles, shopping
sprees, and continued peace of mind, the only way to preserve Earth for our unfortunate
descendents is through adaptation. When a society evaluates a threat, it will only choose to
confront it head-on if it perceives the risk to be both severe and addressable.263 In other words,
climate change must move in the public eye from the realm of debate to that of scientific
certainty—and we must assure populaces that resistance is possible.
Social capital is the key to this shift in public opinion. National media cultures inform a
population’s relationship to consumerism and can be used by a fragmented population to foment
distrust and denialism. Dense social networks contribute to collectivism and social trust, enabling
collective action to respond to the tragedy of the commons posed by environmental degradation.
Conversely, individualism prevents a population from collaborating, creating a culture of distrust
and hindering implementation of climate change policy.
The Nordic nations excel in social capital, possessing extraordinary levels of social trust
and trust in institutions. These traits combine with a media characterized by powerful public
broadcasters and minimal polarization to make an ideal laboratory for risk adaptation.
Contrastingly, the United States is losing its social capital, owing to a breakdown in associational
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involvement that began in the 60s. As Americans leave their memberships and societies behind,
social trust decreases. Combined with a traditional distrust of authority and a polarized media,
Americans are comparatively ill-equipped to address the climate question.
The benefits of Nordic social capital have become apparent in adaptation exceptionalism.
Although the Nordic countries are expected to initially benefit from climate change, due to
improved agriculture and tourism conditions,264 the Nordic nations have made unprecedented
commitments to renewable energy use. For the same amount of carbon emissions, Nordic
countries produce far more electricity. Wind power fuels over forty percent of Danish electricity,
Sweden hopes to be greenhouse gas-free by 2045, and Norway plans to follow suit by 2050. That
isn’t to say that the Nordic nations don’t have their weaknesses. Nordic carbon emissions and
household consumption remain high. However, the success of renewable energy initiatives—and
the public’s willingness to accept a mbitious sustainable development goals—speak to the
success of social capital in regional adaptation.
In theory, socially resilient societies should be the best adaptors. After all, the Nordic
region and the USA share plentiful wealth, infrastructure, technology, and effective education.
However, the missing piece—social capital—can make or break a country’s adaptive response.
In the relatively new climate change debate, the realm of social capital is underexplored as a
source of adaptive capacity. If we are to prevent further climate destruction, we will need to
establish Nordic levels of social capital in all societies in order to mobilize collective action.
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